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TOPOLOGY OF RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS – A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ABSTRACT
The topology of the worldwide network of reciprocal trade agreements is evolving in ways that defy
conventional wisdom. It is at odds with the triad hypothesis, that is, a view of the world consisting of three
mutually isolated major blocs, structured in a hub and spoke fashion - Americas with US as the hub,
Europe with European Union as the hub and Asia with Japan as the hub. Moreover, many new
agreements, traditionally called ‘regional’, are actually inter-regional. In order to make sense of these
developments, we charted the evolution of the network using social network analysis and arrived at a new
perspective on its topology.
Keywords: Regional Trade Agreements, Social Network Analysis, Stumbling Blocks
1. INTRODUCTION
In an ironic turn of events, ever since the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was replaced
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 to create a formal institution to facilitate multilateral trade
agreements, the reverse has actually happened. While the latest round of multilateral trade negotiations
under the aegis of WTO - the Doha round - lingers on, more than a decade after its official launch in
2001, reciprocal trade agreements (RTAs), negotiated directly by individual countries, have proliferated at
a stupendous pace.
The growth in the number of RTAs has been a source of bewilderment, even disappointment, to some
economists. These agreements have been seen as “stumbling blocks” (Limao, 2006) to global free trade,
or worse as “termites in the trading system” (Bhagwati, 2008). The reason for this disappointment is that
RTAs, unlike multilateral trade negotiations, have an ambiguous if not negative impact on international
trade and the welfare of the world. In international economics jargon, RTAs can lead to trade diversion
and are therefore considered inferior to multilateral agreements that lead to trade creation.
This sense of bemusement has been exacerbated by the fact that RTAs have evolved in ways that defy
conventional wisdom. Traditionally, RTAs are called ‘regional’ trade agreements because these
agreements are expected to be signed between countries that are in the same geographic region. Many
of the earliest RTAs were indeed regional. However, a new breed of trade agreements has emerged that
are not regional but rather inter-regional (Baldwin, 2006). Moreover, the network of RTAs does not
correspond well with the conventional view of a world divided into three distinct regional blocs (Krugman,
1991), namely Americas, Europe and Asia, organized in a hub and spoke fashion with United States at
the center of the American bloc, European Union at the center of the European bloc and Japan at the
center of the Asian bloc (Baldwin 2006; Poon, Thompson and Kelly, 2000).
Absence of a systematic method of visualizing all the RTAs together has proven to be a major deterrent
against a good understanding of the topology of the network of RTAs and its evolution (see Crawford &
Fiorentino, 2005 for the only attempt). Social network analysis can overcome this handicap. In this paper,
we have used this technique to develop a new perspective on the evolving configuration of RTAs.
2. ERSTWHILE PERSPECTIVES ON THE TOPOLOGY OF RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
In early to mid nineties, two contrasting perspectives originated regarding the configuration of RTAs. The
first, triad view, raised the possibility that RTAs will evolve such that the world will eventually be divided
into three distinct regional blocs (Krugman, 1991), namely Americas, Europe and Asia, and further that
each bloc will be organized in a hub and spoke configuration, with US as the hub of Americas, EU as the
hub of Europe and Japan as the hub of Asia (Baldwin 2006; Poon, Thompson and Kelly, 2000). The triad
view was based on the proposition that geographically close countries are “natural partners” for trade
(Wonnacott & Lutz 1989; Krugman, 1991; Summers, 1991) due to transportation costs (Frankel, Stein,
and Wei, 1995). The corollary was that the positive effect of trade agreements (trade creation) between

regional neighbors will outweigh their negative effect (trade diversion), providing an incentive for countries
to sign regional rather than inter-regional trade agreements. The second perspective, on the other hand,
viewed the network of RTAs as a nebulous “spaghetti bowl” (Bhagwati, 1995), that is a network in which
countries are related in an arbitrary crisscross fashion without any identifiable pattern.
A more nuanced version of the triad view has been proposed recently. It is similar to the triad view in that
it envisages the network of RTAs to evolve into a network of three large blocs. However, it characterizes
the blocs as “fuzzy” and “leaky” (Baldwin, 2006), in contrast to the clearly identifiable and largely isolated
blocs proposed by the traditional triad view. The fuzziness refers to the absence of clear boundaries of
these blocs while leakiness refers to the fact that members of a particular bloc do not restrict themselves
to that bloc only and sign deals with countries that are outside the bloc too. The fuzzy and leaky triad is
deemed to be driven by a “domino” or “contagion” effect (Baldwin, 1993; Baldwin & Jaimovich, 2012). The
domino effect suggests that as new members join a regional bloc, non-members in the same region find it
even more compelling to join the same bloc. The implication is that regional blocs will expand quickly until
three large blocs remain.
Unfortunately, all the perspectives mentioned above fall short of explaining the actual network of RTAs. In
the following pages, we present a more realistic perspective, derived from a social network analysis of the
RTAs currently in force.
3. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The latest list of RTAs that have been notified to the WTO and are in force was obtained from the WTO
regional trade agreements database. Only reciprocal agreements (agreements involving commitments
from all the signatories) were considered. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs), where commitments are
one sided, were not included because PTAs do not represent any mutual relationship among the parties
involved. WTO also makes a clear distinction between regional and preferential agreements for the same
reason. The agreements involve goods or services or both, and were filed under different WTO
provisions, namely GATT XXIV, GATS V and the Enabling Clause. This paper is concerned with the
structure rather than the nature, terms or the depth of relationships among countries; therefore, individual
differences of the sort mentioned above were ignored.
Social network analysis was performed on the data using the igraph package of R, a software
environment for performing statistical analysis. Each country was represented as a node. An edge from
one country to the other represented their membership in a reciprocal trade agreement (Figures 1 to 3).
When three or more countries were involved in a particular trade agreement, the relationship was
represented as a set of edges between each pair of signatories. For example, NAFTA, a trilateral
agreement between US, Canada and Mexico, was represented as a set of three edges namely USCanada, US-Mexico and Canada-Mexico. Only European Union (EU) was not broken down in this
manner for two reasons. First, EU is perhaps the only multilateral trade agreement whose members do
not sign trade agreements with non-EU countries as individual countries. Not only that, once a country
becomes a member of EU, all the previous agreements signed by that country are cancelled. In other
words, EU countries behave strictly as a unit, unlike most if not all other multilateral trade agreements.
Second, EU consists of a large number of countries; therefore, representing it as a single entity saved
space and should make visualization easier for the reader. For easy comparison between figures and to
avoid confusion, the earlier incarnation of EU, the European Economic Community, was also denoted as
EU in all the figures.
Using the year when each agreement came into force, snapshots of the network of RTAs were
constructed as on 1985, 1995 and 2014, that is at roughly ten year intervals. This was done to show the
evolution of the network over time. Communities or blocs of countries in each snapshot were detected
using the edge betweenness algorithm. The algorithm is based on the idea that countries forming a
community will have more relationships with each other than with countries outside the community. This
algorithm was chosen among other alternatives based on its ability to generate communities that
correspond well with actual deals signed. For example, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are members of

EFTA and should be part of the same community, unless each individual country has signed many deals
on its own. Each community was shown with a different color while white color was reserved for countries
that did not belong to any community. The size of each node was determined by its degree or the number
of relationships it had, and its betweenness centrality or the degree to which a particular node served as a
go-between. The distance between nodes is indicative of the closeness of their relationship.
Figure 1 shows the network as on 1985. Five different and mutually isolated communities were detected,
four of which were regional while the fifth was inter-regional. The four regional communities can be
labeled as EU and Friends, Australia-New Zealand and Neighboring Islands, Caribbean Islands, and
Central America. The inter-regional community consisted of an assorted group of Latin American
countries, Asian countries, Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Romania and US. None of the communities
contained identifiable hubs. Japan was not even in the picture and US had only one agreement at the
time. Also, the continent of Africa was largely absent except for Egypt and Tunisia.

Figure 1. Network of reciprocal trade agreements in 1985

By 1995, the inter-regional community grew in size considerably, adding mostly developing countries,
primarily from Asia and Africa (Figure 2). Moreover, it got connected to previously isolated EU and
Friends community through Turkey and Israel, Central America community through Nicaragua, and the
Caribbean Islands community through Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago. Two new African communities
were detected and these were also connected to the large inter-regional community through connectors
like Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Benin, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Tanzania. The community that remained
isolated was Australia-New Zealand and Neighboring Islands. A new isolated community arose,
consisting of countries formed by the division of USSR. Once again, there were no identifiable hubs in
any of the communities. Moreover, both US and EU were largely isolated from the rest of the world and
Japan was still absent from the scene. These facts contradict the triad view entirely. The inter-regional
community was serving as a hub, connecting various other regional communities.

Figure 2. Network of reciprocal trade agreements in 1995

By 2014, none of the communities were completely isolated (Figure 3). All major economies, namely US,
EU, Japan and China became active participants in the network and all of them got connected to the
largest community, the inter-regional community of largely developing countries. A large number of
countries, including major economies of EU, US, and Japan and China were independent and were not
part of any particular community. The inter-regional community did not grow much but was the hub
binding all the other communities or independent countries together, either directly or through connectors.
Once again, there was no sign of a triad and of any hubs within each community. EU did, however, play
the role of a small hub connecting countries in multiple regions of the world.

Figure 3. Network of reciprocal trade agreements in 2014

4. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a comprehensive view of the evolution of the network of RTAs. It is
evident that the network has evolved in ways that defy conventional wisdom. Specifically, the network is
at odds with both the triad view and the “spaghetti bowl” view. While distinct communities and patterns
can be identified, there is little evidence of a triad, leave alone a triad of clearly identifiable blocs, each
with a hub and spoke structure. US and Japan are both reluctant participants and play a peripheral role
rather than being hubs. EU does play the role of a hub but connects countries and communities across
various parts of the world and not just in Europe.
Further, the “natural partners” hypothesis was defied both by large and medium sized economies. These
countries have completed many inter-regional RTAs. However, small economies do show a tendency to
stay within their neighborhoods. Few examples of these are the Forum of the Caribbean countries
(CARIFORUM), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) in Africa, and the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) in
the Pacific.
The biggest community of all was an inter-regional community of mainly developing economies. It was
created through the Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) of 1973 and later expanded by the Global
System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP) of 1989. This community is not only
the largest but also acts as the glue binding virtually all other countries or regional communities.
Based on the current network, RTAs are closer to being “building blocks” than being “stumbling blocks” to
the global free trade. Our prediction is that the inter-regional community will eventually merge with other
medium to large economies, forming a common core of RTAs. Small economies will continue to limit
themselves in regional communities but will be connected to this common core via connectors (Figure 4).
The main conclusion of this paper, therefore, is that a multipolar network of geography defying
relationships is a more realistic perspective to think about RTAs than that of a geography driven triad
dominated by regional hegemons.

Figure 4. New perspective on the topology of reciprocal trade agreements
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